

# College Athletes Everywhere Just Wanna Be Free

By Tom Kruckemeyer and Sarah Steelman

## Executive Summary

### Big Time College Sports-The Best of Times and the Worst of Times

The 2014 "March Madness" basketball tournament is in the books and millions of college sports fans are looking forward to football in just a few months. Major college sports programs are enjoying a wave of popularity measured by fan interest along with the huge sums of money that result. The last year of available data shows the 121 schools that comprise the college *Football Bowl Subdivision* (FBS) reported revenues in excess of \$7.1 billion, or an average of about \$59 million per school. The *FBS* is the NCAA classification for the major football and most major basketball playing schools.

Despite the vast sums of money filling the coffers of major college Athletic Departments, the college sports "world order" is under perhaps unprecedented threat. In January of 2014, the *Northwestern University* football team began the process of formally seeking union representation. On March 26<sup>th</sup>, the *National Labor Relations Board* in Chicago ruled that the members of the football team were in an employer/employee relationship with the school and that their efforts to unionize were legal. There can be no question that the current financial system generates vast amounts of money for big time college football and men's basketball programs. Nearly all fans of major college sports know that many coaches are paid salaries well in excess of \$1 million annually. In view of the enormous amounts of revenue that they generate, the question has increasingly become is "paying" student-athletes solely a scholarship still justified? This, in turn, requires us to ask what would/should a major college football and/or Men's basketball player be paid if he was compensated in accordance with free market principles based on his true economic value. *College Athletes Everywhere Just Wanna Be Free* answers this question and many more.

How did we do it? The *Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act* (EADA) requires universities to report financial data pertaining to their athletic programs to the U.S. Dept. of Education. Using the EADA data for the revenues generated by each school's football and men's basketball program, adjusted to include a portion of so-called "Unallocated by Gender/Sport" revenue, along with assuming that a compensation system for college athletes would approximate those of their professional equivalents, we have determined that for the top 75 schools (in terms of revenues) the *annual* economic worth of an *average* football player is **\$435,000** and the economic worth of an *average* men's basketball player is **\$591,000**. Note that these are *averages*. Obviously, outstanding performers, as in professional sports, are worth substantially more. Contrast these amounts to the value of a scholarship for most publicly supported universities; generally \$18,000 to \$30,000 a year.

Clearly, big time college football and Men's basketball players are being short changed in terms of pure dollars. In addition, major college athletic programs often graduate a relatively low percent of their players, fail to provide long term health insurance that would cover chronic injuries sustained while playing, and enforce restrictive rules that prevent players from going to another FBS school without sitting out a year. Note also that only about 10% of FBS level football/ men's basketball players move up to big paydays in the NFL/NBA.

Most experts agree that there are degrees of reforms for FBS football and basketball. The paper discusses an array of potential improvements to the current system along with their pros and cons. These include

paying a "stipend" that exceeds the cost of attendance, modifying transfer rules along with mandating comprehensive long term health care/insurance. Certainly these sorts of changes would be beneficial, but in terms of bringing about genuinely equitable treatment for the athletes, may not be equal to the task. As such our paper also constructs a free market approach to paying college athletes in an openly professional system. In a free market the largest FBS schools would participate in a College Sponsored Professional League that would operate similar to the NFL/NBA. All restrictions could be removed from the athlete and scholarships would no longer be offered. Students would be encouraged to enroll in their sponsoring college but not required. They could move between FBS level teams or to the NFL/NBA if their skills warrant. Each top echelon football program would receive about \$24 million to be allocated as follows: 47 percent for football salaries; 23 percent for coaching and staffs and 30 percent returned to the sponsoring school. Based on these figures and a 55-man roster, players would earn, around \$400,000 to \$450,000 per year. Basketball, with a similar framework, would yield player salaries in the \$550,000 to \$600,000 range. Hopefully, the player would choose to use their income to enroll in college and earn a degree. They could move on to the NFL/NBA if there was interest. Just like the NFL/NBA, the participating college teams would have to agree to a revenue sharing plan, salary caps, roster size, and minimum salaries.

Two additional reforms could make the free market framework more palatable. First, require that the athlete attend the sponsoring college. He could take one class or five but he would be directly responsible for tuition from his football or basketball income. Secondly, require the CSPL to create an insurance fund for FBS college athletes to cover their injuries during play or practice plus limited coverage for future disabilities arising from injuries received during play; for example concussions and the problems that may arise from head injuries in the future. Currently, there is no insurance pool that assists FBS college players to the extent necessary.

These two reforms combined with a free market approach to compensating student athletes would eliminate the unfairness and exploitive nature of the current system of big time college sports. It would obviate any need for "under the table" payments to players and/or the need for academic subterfuge that occurs at many big time programs. Let's face facts. Athletes everywhere just wanna be free!

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## Introduction

American college sporting events have been providing entertainment to large audiences across the land for well over 100 years. While today's fans are now accustomed to watching football games attended by 100,000 fans or more, crowds at late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century football contests were substantial. The 1905 battle between Harvard and Yale was seen by an estimated 43,000 fans.<sup>1</sup> So, big crowds at college football and men's basketball games are nothing new. What is relatively new is the explosion in the number of games being televised, along with substantial sums for the broadcast rights being paid by a variety of both traditional and cable TV networks. Indeed, if your household has the wherewithal to afford a decent cable TV package, on any given Saturday in the fall, you are probably able to view all or part of about 20 or more college football games. When the calendar turns over to November, men's college basketball is omnipresent on the airwaves until early April when the March Madness basketball tournament concludes\*.

It would be reasonable to assume that even casual fans of major college sports understand that marquee and even not so marquee schools are generating huge sums of revenue. The more avid fans (those paying substantial amounts of money to attend games) are even more likely to be attuned to this. Furthermore, the salaries earned by the most successful coaches exceed \$1 million. Owing to this and to the recurring problems encountered by some schools in the realm of academic subterfuge (to keep athletes who may be marginal students eligible) and financial subterfuge (financial rewards to players that do not conform to *National Collegiate Athletic Association* (NCAA) amateur status regulations) have led to renewed interest in devising reform(s) that allow above board monetary compensation to college athletes. On January 29, 2014, the *Northwestern University* football team began the process of seeking formal union representation. As noted, most fans are aware of the fact that major college Football (FB) and Men's Basketball (MBB) in 2014 are generating fabulous amounts of revenue and that the players (especially star players) may be getting something less than their just rewards even after accounting for the value of the scholarship that most receive. The bulk of this section attempts to scientifically estimate the market worth or true economic value of today's major college FB/MBB athletes.

## Section 1- The True Value of Major College Football and Men Basketball Players

The task of estimating the true economic value of major college FB/MBB players is made possible because detailed information on athletic revenues and expenses is reported annually to the *United States Department of Education* which in turn makes this available on a website titled *The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool*.<sup>2</sup> **Please note that this website will be the source for all financial data pertaining to college athletic revenues and expenses in the remainder of this paper.**

\*The October 26, 2013 *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* sports section listed 27 college football games as being available on television in the St. Louis market depending, presumably, upon the level of one's cable/satellite TV service. In a like manner, the February 8, 2014 *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* sports section listed 32 college basketball games as being available on television in the St. Louis market.

The website generally breaks revenue down by the following categories:

- Football
- Men's Basketball
- Women's Basketball

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<sup>1</sup> *The Big Scrum-How Teddy Roosevelt Saved College Football* by John Miller Page 196

<sup>2</sup> <http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/GetOneInstitutionData.aspx>

- All Other Men's Sports
- All Other Women's Sports
- Not Allocated by Gender/Sport
- **Total Revenue**

The existence of this information provides an excellent starting point for estimating the economic value of today's big time college FB/MBB athletes. When studying this data, however, it becomes apparent that additional research is most likely in order. This is because at nearly all schools, the category *Not Allocated by Gender/Sport* contains a substantial portion of the total revenue. On average, *Southeast Conference (SEC)* schools place over 21% of their revenue into this category while again, on average, *Big 10* schools place about 26% under this heading. Overall, for the schools in our sample about 27% of total revenue is in this category. Contacts with various athletic departments reveal that the main sources of revenues that are allocated to the *Not Allocated by Gender/Sport* include:

1. **Donations to the athletic department from so-called "boosters"** – This consists of direct donations to the athletic department and may include donations that are required to be allowed to purchase football and/or basketball tickets.
2. **Student Fees/ Institutional Support** – At some schools, students are assessed an athletic/activity fee along with their tuition bill. A portion of this money is often used to help finance the athletic operation. In a like manner, some schools provide direct support to the athletic operation from general operating funds.
3. **Broadcast Rights** – Many schools sell TV/Radio broadcast rights as a package to syndicators who in turn sell the broadcasts to radio/TV stations. Generally, the broadcast rights cover FB/MBB and may cover other sports as well.
4. **Licensing and Merchandise Sales** – This consists of revenues realized by the schools from the sale of just about anything you can think of with the school logo/mascot on the merchandise in question.
5. **Conference Distributions** – The conferences to which nearly all big time FB/MBB programs belong have varying intra-conference revenue sharing arrangements. It is common, for instance, for revenues from the Men's March Madness basketball tournament to be allocated to a Conference based upon the number of games in which the conference member participates. The conference then distributes this money to members regardless of their participation in said tournament. Football post-season bowl game receipts are also allocated in this fashion.

It is certainly acknowledged that allocating the above revenues to a specific sport may be difficult and in some cases impossible. Boosters may be genuinely indifferent as to which sport their donations assist and those buying merchandise with team logos may do so because they think the apparel looks cool and have little or no interest in FB/MBB. That said, since we know that at most schools FB/MBB generate the vast majority of the revenue the vast majority of the time, it seems reasonable to attribute at least some of the *Not Allocated by Gender/Sport* revenue to FB/MBB. In order to do this, we have developed a straightforward method that assumes that *Not Allocated by Gender/Sport* should accrue to football and Men's basketball in the same percentage that they comprise of revenues that are specifically allocated to the respective sports categories. If football is credited with 50% of allocated revenues at a given school, then football is credited with 50% of the unallocated revenues. The sum of these two totals then becomes the school's entire revenue attributable to their football program. This number, in turn, can be used to posit an estimate of the true economic worth of a FB or MBB player. As the system for allocating Not Allocated by Gender/Sport revenue is critical to this segment of the paper, let us examine in detail the calculations for a particular college. The school we have chosen is Louisiana State University (LSU). As most fans know, LSU has had a highly successful football program in recent years and is among the

leaders in total athletic department receipts. Furthermore, if the LSU mascot, *Mike the Tiger*, were to learn that we chose a different school for this, he would be most unhappy and no good would come from that. Let us look at LSU revenues for the fiscal year ending in June of 2013:

LSU Revenues for 2013	Revenues	Pct. Of Allocated Revenue
Football	\$74,275,838	82.0%
Men's Basketball	\$7,846,341	8.7%
Women's Basketball	\$434,457	0.5%
All Other Men's Sports	\$7,140,798	7.9%
All Other Women's Sports	\$845,675	0.9%
Subtotal- Allocated Revenues	\$90,543,109	100%
Unallocated to Sport/Gender	\$26,914,289	
Total Revenue	\$117,457,398	
Total Football Revenue	\$96,354,618	
Total Men's Basketball Revenue	\$10,178,696	

The above chart shows that Football accounts for 82.0% of allocated revenue while Men's basketball is responsible for 8.7% of allocated revenue. Crediting these sports with the same percent of unallocated revenue (82.0% and 8.7% respectively) yields the following estimate of their revenue generation.

Football

Allocated Revenue	\$74,275,838
Share of Unallocated Revenue	\$22,078,780
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>\$96,354,618</b>

Men's Basketball

Allocated Revenue	\$7,846,341
Share of Unallocated Revenue	\$2,332,335
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>\$10,178,696</b>

This same calculation was performed for each school in the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS). In addition to FBS schools, twelve schools that feature prominent Men's basketball programs that do not participate in FBS football or football at any level have been added.

Having devised a system that provides an accurate estimate of the revenues generated by the big time college FB and MBB programs, an estimate of the true economic value of the players can be made. To complete the estimate, a few additional assumptions are needed.

**Roster Sizes** – For purposes of this estimate, a football roster of 55 players is assumed. This would be roughly comparable to the roster size of National Football League (NFL) teams. In 2013, the maximum NFL game roster was 53 players, plus an emergency quarterback. In addition, NFL teams generally have a handful of players under contract on their practice squad who are occasionally elevated to the active roster when injuries occur. In FBS football, the maximum number of scholarships is set at 85. Most FBS schools have all scholarships allocated most of the time and often have the team supplemented by “walk on” players who sometimes are valuable additions to the team. Even though major college teams go into battle with as many as 100 players available, it seems reasonable to assume that if college teams were forced to “compensate” players with something over and above a scholarship, the roster sizes would approximate the professional standard.

Turning to basketball, a roster size of 13 is assumed, which also approximates National Basketball Association (NBA) standards. Currently, NBA teams must have an active roster of 12 players plus at least one and up to three players on an inactive roster. Major college Men’s basketball allows teams a maximum of 13 scholarships plus “walk-ons”. Again, it seems reasonable to assume that if college teams were forced to “compensate” players with something more than a scholarship, the roster sizes would again approximate the professional standard; in this instance 13 players.

**Revenue Allocation for Players** – For purposes of this estimate, it is assumed that major colleges should be able to pay players the same percentage of total revenue that are paid to NFL and NBA players. The current collective bargaining agreement for the NFL allots 47% to 48.5% of total revenues<sup>3</sup> to players while the NBA agreement calls for 49% to 51% depending on the amount of revenues realized<sup>4</sup>. For our estimate, 47% for Football and 49% for Men’s basketball is used.

Based upon the above calculations/assumptions, let us look at what the average “salary” of major college FB/MBB players would be if they were paid based upon the revenue they generate and if they were paid subject to strictures similar to those currently governing professional FB/MBB. Data is for the 2012 season.

### Football’s Top 20

University	Average Player Annual “Salary”
Texas	\$1,119,486
Alabama	\$992,863
Oklahoma	\$877,701
Florida	\$853,778
Notre Dame	\$825,501
Louisiana State (LSU)	\$823,394
Michigan	\$821,786
Auburn	\$769,197
Iowa	\$723,182
Georgia	\$691,066
Ohio State	\$685,815
Tennessee	\$654,225
Arkansas	\$641,283
Penn State	\$635,690

<sup>3</sup> <http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/25/the-cba-in-a-nutshell>

<sup>4</sup> <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/story/2011-12-A-union-sends-deal-summary-to-players-before-they-vote/51719470/1>

South Carolina	\$625,137
Wisconsin	\$608,714
Nebraska	\$602,751
Oregon	\$579,096
Washington	\$551,207
University Southern CA (USC)	\$523,464

Please see Appendix for this data for all Schools.

The above table shows us the top 20 in terms of Football. Other salient numbers:

**Average “Salary” for Entire Sample                      \$304,375**

**Average “Salary” for the Top 75 Schools                      \$435,352**

Note that the Entire Sample for Football includes all current FBS schools. The data set includes the U.S. Military Academy (Army) but does not include Navy or Air Force for which data was not available. Note that the data for “Army” was for the year ending in June of 2012. Total schools included number 121.

Before proceeding to Men’s basketball, let us emphasize that these are the *average* salaries and are based upon revenue generated during the 2012 season.

### **Men’s Basketball Top 20**

<b>University</b>	<b>Average Player Annual “Salary”</b>
Louisville	\$2,085,706
Kansas	\$1,523,218
Kentucky	\$1,345,712
Indiana	\$1,300,014
Arizona	\$1,062,475
Wisconsin	\$1,019,321
Duke	\$1,015,538
Syracuse	\$997,814
North Carolina	\$946,413
Ohio State	\$929,378
North Carolina State	\$851,693
Minnesota	\$851,488
Maryland	\$838,294
Illinois	\$794,213
Texas	\$762,635
Purdue	\$741,552
Michigan State	\$731,461
Arkansas	\$714,184
Northwestern	\$705,771
Tennessee	\$694,322

Please see Appendix for this data for all Schools.

The above table shows us the top 20 in terms of Men's basketball. Other salient numbers:

<b>Average "Salary" for Entire Sample</b>	<b>\$396,927</b>
<b>Average "Salary" for the Top 75 Schools</b>	<b>\$591,804</b>

Note that the Entire Sample for Men's BB includes all current FBS schools plus twelve selected prominent basketball schools not participating in FBS football or any level of football. The data set includes the U.S. Military Academy (Army) but does not include Navy nor Air Force for which data was not available. Note that the data for "Army" was for the year ending in June of 2012. Total schools included number 133.

**Holy Dick Vitale!!** Recall once more that these are *average* salaries and are based upon revenues generated during the 2012/2013 basketball season.

While today's big time FB/MBB players are not paid with significant amounts of money, most receive an athletic scholarship that generally covers the costs of attending the university for a year. What is the monetary value of this? Obviously, college costs vary substantially from school to school. Nonetheless, we know that the vast majority of the schools in our sample are 4 year publicly supported universities. In a recent report, the *College Board* reported that for the 2013/2014 academic years that the average cost for tuition/fees, room and board for an in-state student is \$18,391 and the average cost for tuition/fees, room and board for an out-state student is \$31,701.<sup>5</sup> While we are aware of the fact that the cost of attending a small number of private schools in the sample is well above these levels, it is still fair to say that the above board "pay" allotted to the average major college FB/MBB player is on the order of \$25,000 per year.

Even for those with limited mathematics skill, it is clear that \$25,000 is a lot less than \$435,352 (average annual value of a football player in the top 75 programs) and a lot less than \$591,804 (average annual value of a basketball player in the top 75 programs).

**The fundamental result is that by any reasonable standard, major college FB/MBB players are woefully undercompensated.**

### **Perspective on the above estimates**

It is by acknowledged that reasonable people may disagree about the veracity of the estimates of the true economic worth of major college FB/MBB players. That said, the major data sources and assumptions used here are largely above reproach.

**Football/Men's Basketball Revenue** – The data for *explicitly allocated* FB/MBB revenue is drawn directly from that reported to the U.S. Department of Education and found on *The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool* website. An examination of the sources of *Not Allocated by Gender/Sport* revenue clearly shows that these respond positively to interest in FB/MBB and that a reasonable amount of these totals should be allocated to FB/MBB. The allocation method may overstate or understate these amounts for a given school or for a given year, but in general, their inclusion greatly enhances the accuracy of the estimates.

**Roster Size** – As noted, if colleges were paying the players with some significant amount of money, there would be strong incentives to have roster sizes adequate to play the games, but no more. Thus having roster sizes that approximate the NFL/NBA standards is reasonable. Note also that college FB teams play a 12/13 game schedule

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<sup>5</sup> <http://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing>

(depending on Bowl game participation) while NFL teams play 16 games plus playoffs for 12 teams. College basketball teams generally play 30 to 35 games (depending on post season tournament participation) while NBA teams play 82 regular season games plus playoffs for sixteen clubs. Therefore the roster sizes assumed here seem appropriate.

**Revenue Allocated to Player Compensation** – The percent of total revenues allocated to player compensation in the NFL/NBA are the results of many years of intense negotiation between team owners and the respective players’ unions. Given that the economic forces at work have similar characteristics, one would assume that if negotiations were to take place between college team “owners” and college players that a similar result would come about.

Note that even if one were to assume somewhat smaller FB/MBB revenues, a somewhat larger team roster and a somewhat smaller player compensation revenue allocation, the fundamental results would not be significantly altered.

## Section 2 - So What Do They Do With All of This Money?

For the year ending in June of 2013, the schools in our sample (the FBS plus select Men’s basketball powers) reported revenues of about \$7.4 billion or an average of about \$55.6 million per school. As they do not pay any significant amount of this to the players, one has to wonder what the heck they do with all of this money?

The basic answer to this question is that said money is used to operate amateur intercollegiate athletic programs in a wide variety of sports. NCAA regulations require that FBS schools field teams in at least 16 sports. Let us begin with a quick recapitulation of the revenue generated by major category. **Note that the allocations for Football, Men’s Basketball and “Unallocated by Gender/Sport” use the allocation system detailed above.**

### Total Revenues for FBS/Select Basketball Powers for Year Ending June 2013 in Millions

Football	\$4,320.8
Men’s Basketball	\$1,400.8
Women’s Basketball	\$219.1
All Other Men’s Sports	\$411.3
All Other Women’s Sports	\$581.9
Unallocated by Gender/Sport	\$466.6
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>\$7,400.5</b>

The interesting fact that quickly emerges is that FB/MBB account for 77.3% of total revenue. This is the *average* for the 133 schools in the sample. There are schools that boast successful Women’s BB, Ice Hockey and Baseball teams where these sports may account for more significant portions of total receipts, but in general the FB/MBB teams do most of the heavy lifting. The basic pecking order for the flow of funds found is revenues are used to finance the FB/MBB programs, pay the overhead associated with these operations and then to finance the so-called “non-revenue” sports. In general, the non-revenue sports are all sports except FB/MBB. Obviously, the non-revenue sports generate considerable revenue. Nonetheless, one would be hard pressed to find very many non-revenue sports that are able to cover their costs with revenues that they were able to generate on their own. (The highly successful Women’s Basketball program at the University of Connecticut reported a loss of about \$1.2 million for the year ending in June of 2013).



much detail regarding the categories of expenses, it is clear that in addition to providing the athletic scholarship, the expenses would include:

- Equipment and Uniforms
- Travel to Away Games
- Constructing/Maintaining Game and Practice Facilities
- Player Recruitment
- General Administrative Overhead
- Academic Assistance/Counseling, if Needed
- Medical and Other Types of Insurance
- Last but Not Least- **Salaries for Coaches**

Almost certainly the best known beneficiaries of the current system are the head coaches meting out advice and encouraging words to their Football and Men’s Basketball squads. In many states, the head Football or Men’s Basketball coach is easily the highest paid employee of any publicly supported institution. On the salaries earned by the leading FB/MBB coaches, here are a few notes about the following data.

The Football coach data is for all FBS schools for the 2013 season for which data was available that resulted in a total sample of 118 schools.

The Men’s Basketball coach data was for all schools that participated in the 2012 and/or 2013 NCAA March Madness basketball tournament. The result was data for a total sample of 87 schools as a substantial number of schools played in both years. For schools that played in both years, the most recent year’s data is used.

The coaches are ranked by “Grand Total Pay with Bonuses”. The coaches may not achieve their maximum bonus each year. Nonetheless, as the bonuses seem to represent a substantial portion of total compensation at many schools, this is probably the most equitable means for presenting the data. (See Appendix for more details and for data on all coaches)

### **Top 20 Total Pay for Football Head Coaches for 2013 Season**

College	Head Football Coach	Grand Total Pay with Bonuses
Texas	Mack Brown	\$6,304,000
Alabama	Nick Saban	\$6,246,000
Tennessee	Butch Jones	\$5,860,000
Arkansas	Bret Bielema	\$5,859,000
Iowa	Kirk Ferentz	\$5,735,000
Oklahoma	Bob Stoops	\$5,593,000
Arizona State	Todd Graham	\$5,462,000
Louisiana State	Les Miles	\$5,159,000
Ohio State	Urban Meyer	\$5,158,000
S. Carolina	Steve Spurrier	\$4,873,000
Michigan	Brady Hoke	\$4,704,000
Louisville	Charlie Strong	\$4,547,000
Georgia	Mark Richt	\$4,314,000
Washington	Steve Sarkasian	\$4,100,000
Oklahoma St.	Mike Gundy	\$4,000,000
Nebraska	Bo Pelini	\$3,975,000
Colorado	Mike MacIntyre	\$3,904,000
Texas A&M	Kevin Sumlin	\$3,850,000

Auburn	Gus Malzahn	\$3,690,000
Missouri	Gary Pinkel	\$3,650,000

**Average Grand Total Pay for Entire Sample (118 schools)      \$2,246,000**

**Average Grand Total Pay for the Top 75 Schools                      \$3,124,000**

Source: *USA Today* - [www.usatoday.com/sports/college/salaries/ncaaf/coach/](http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/salaries/ncaaf/coach/)

## Top 20 Total Pay for Men’s Basketball Head Coaches for 2012/13 Season

College	Head Men’s Basketball Coach	Grand Total Pay with Bonuses
Duke	Mike Krzyzewski	\$7,234,000
Kentucky	John Calipari	\$6,238,000
Louisville	Rick Pitino	\$5,698,000
Kansas	Bill Self	\$5,486,000
Minnesota	Tubby Smith	\$4,816,000
Florida	Billy Donovan	\$4,161,000
Michigan State	Tom Izzo	\$4,096,000
Indiana	Tom Crean	\$3,606,000
Ohio State	Thad Matta	\$3,604,000
Arizona	Sean Miller	\$3,504,000
North Carolina State	Mark Gottfried	\$3,263,000
Purdue	Matt Painter	\$3,227,000
Texas	Rick Barnes	\$3,190,000
Virginia	Tony Bennett	\$3,182,000
Connecticut	Jim Calhoun	\$2,809,000
Wisconsin	Bo Ryan	\$2,757,000
UCLA	Ben Howland	\$2,485,000
Missouri	Frank Haith	\$2,475,000
Oklahoma	Lon Kruger	\$2,370,000
Oregon	Dana Altman	\$2,320,000

**Average Grand Total Pay for Entire Sample (87 schools)                      \$1,714,000**

**Average Grand Total Pay for the Top 75 Schools                                      \$1,956,000**

Source: *USA Today* - [www.usatoday.com/sports/college/salaries/ncaab/coach/](http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/salaries/ncaab/coach/)

There can be no doubt that major college FB/MBB coaches are very well compensated. When sports and money are being discussed, really big dollar totals are often bandied about and there may be a tendency to fail to grasp their true meaning. Suppose that one had a job with gross pay of around \$2 million per year. Let’s assume that after taxes and health insurance deductibles are deducted that one is left with say 70% of this total. That means that **every month**, one’s take home pay is roughly \$117,000. Certainly big time FB/MBB coaches work extremely hard and are under an awful lot of pressure, but then the same is true of the crew staffing your local *Burger King* during each day’s lunch time rush.

The point of all this is not to debate whether or not big-time coaches should or should not be paid these enormous salaries. It is to highlight that they are part of an extremely profitable enterprise that produces the revenue needed to support these salaries. The relentless pressure to win puts successful coaches in a strong bargaining position as their services may be coveted at schools struggling to win an adequate number of contests. The profitability of this enterprise is, to a substantial degree, the result of the fact that major college FB/MBB players are “paid” a very small fraction of what they are worth. In a like manner, the data on “spending per participant” which tends to be at least \$113,000 in excess of the “cost” of the typical scholarship indicates that the spending on non-revenue sports is almost certainly excessive relative to the actual resources needed to adequately operate intercollegiate teams in these sports. While it may be something of an oversimplification, the basic dynamic is that the profits generated by the FB/MBB players make possible the bountiful funding of non-revenue sports and support the generally enormous salaries paid to those who administer/coach the FB/MBB operations as highlighted by the coaches salary data cited here. A case can be clearly made that all of this is unfair to the FB/MBB players, but wait, there’s more! In the next section, a look at some of the other ways in which the revenue producing athletes are getting the short end of the stick; or no stick at all, is explored.

### Section 3 – It is Not Just the Money

In addition to “compensation” that comes woefully short of their true economic worth, there are a number of other ways that the present system shortchanges players. Let us review several of the most egregious.

**Graduation Rates** – No one disputes that a college scholarship and the implied opportunity for a college education has substantial value. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, big-time college athletic programs often have graduation rates that are well below the average for that school’s student body as a whole. Under the current system, student athletes presumably attend college to graduate with a degree and more importantly to learn how to think. According to the NCAA, the FBS graduation success rates hit an all time high in 2006-2012 for the first time since tracking began in 1995. This figure was 82 percent and includes all student athletes. The football student-athletes earned a 71 percent graduation success rate. The graduation success rate (GSR) for basketball dropped one percentage point from last year to 73 percent. (GSRs are calculated on six years as opposed to 4 and include transfer students. The federal graduation rate does not include transfers.) According to the NCAA, federal graduation rates for Division 1 athletes had an overall graduation rate of 65 percent as compared to the general student body graduation rate of 64 percent. The NCAA reports the GSR for Men’s basketball increased from 56% in 1995 to 73% for 2006 freshman graduating in 2012. For FBS football it increased from 63% in 1995 to 71% for freshman in 2006 graduating in 2012. It is important to note that these are aggregate trends and they reflect a positive increase in overall graduation rates. Let us look at some additional graduation rate analysis. According to the 2013 Bootleg’s Graduation Rate Analysis<sup>6</sup> published by Scout.Com, here are the worst schools in terms of FB/MBB graduation rates. The bottom ten in each major sport are listed.

College	Bottom 10 Football Graduation Rates
Florida International	40%
Oklahoma	47%
Central Michigan	47%
California-Berkeley	48%
San Jose State	48%
Eastern Michigan	52%
Florida Atlantic	52%

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.stanford.scout.com/2/1273612.html>

Arizona	53%
South Florida	53%
Washington State	53%

College	Bottom 10 Men's Basketball Graduation Rates
Connecticut	10%
Florida	17%
Georgia Tech	18%
Arkansas	25%
Mississippi State	29%
Wisconsin	40%
Indiana	43%
U of Southern California (USC)	43%
Temple	43%
Ohio State	45%

It is notable that dismal graduation rates are often found at schools in top the echelon of the revenue producing FB/MBB programs.

Some schools are still struggling and have significant deficits between their football and basketball student athlete graduation rates and the general student population. Once again, according to the 2013 Bootleg's Graduation Rate Analysis<sup>7</sup> published by Scout, the worst schools graduation rate deficit for football include some of the FBS schools. The graduation rate deficit is defined as the difference between the graduation rates for the student body overall relative to the graduation rate for the FB/MBB teams in question. In fact the top ten deficits are as follows:

College	Football Graduation Rate "Deficit"
California-Berkeley	-42%
U of Southern California (USC)	-32%
U of California- Los Angeles (UCLA)	-28%
Georgia Tech	-24%
Virginia	-24%
Texas	-22%
Michigan	-20%
Oklahoma	-18%
Florida State	-17%
Wisconsin	-17%

In basketball, the deficits are much larger.

College	Basketball Graduation Rate "Deficit"
Connecticut	-69%

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

Florida	-66%
Georgia Tech	-61%
U of Southern California (USC)	-46%
Wisconsin	-42%
California-Berkeley	-40%
Arkansas	-33%
Maryland	-32%
Mississippi State	-31%
Ohio State	-31%

These schools, and others with sub standard graduation rates, are short-changing their students for their lifetime by not finding ways to increase the graduation rate for student athletes. If students are taking six years to graduate, then the remaining year is not covered by their scholarship because they are only eligible to play for five years. The cost of an additional year of school required to graduate is significant. Reform should include compensation for a sixth year of school if the player has maintained his academic standing and scholarship standing. He dedicated five years of his life balancing football and/or basketball while earning credits towards his degrees just to come up short in the end. This inequity should be recognized and corrected.

**Year to Year Scholarships and Inequitable Transfer Rules** – One of the major violations of free market principles that NCAA regulations and customs visit upon revenue generating athletes are the twin practices of imposing rules that make transferring to a different college difficult and generally offering scholarships for one-year terms that are renewable at the schools discretion.

For major college sports programs, the recruiting process ends, in a sense, when national “letters of intent” are signed by a new group of recruits. In general, this binds the player to his chosen institution for his entire career. As these letters of intent are signed by prospective players who are usually about 17 years old, it is not difficult to imagine that should things not be working out, said players may wish to transfer another school. Obviously, on a football team with 85 scholarship players, meaningful or any playing time may be hard to come by. In addition to lack of opportunity to play, players may well have plenty of other good reasons to want to move to a different school. This is in obvious contrast to the absence of any rules that prevent coaches from “transferring”. Each year, coaches move unfettered by NCAA rules from one school to greener pastures at another school. Proponents of the current restrictive transfer system claim that these rules prevent schools from raiding each other’s players. While this may be true, it would seem that this basically benefits the established programs by helping them “stockpile” talented players at the expense of lesser programs and at the expense of the players who may well be better off in a different program.

In terms of fostering competition, we will merely point out that in professional sports, players move between teams not only in the off season, but intra-season player team changes are common. All baseball fans can recall their favorite team’s best/worst mid-season player trade.

In addition to the inequitable transfer rules, most players are granted only a one-year scholarship. The NCAA states the following regarding scholarships:

“At a minimum, an athletic scholarship must be a one academic year agreement. In Division I, (FBS level schools) institutions are permitted to offer multiyear scholarships. It’s scholarships may be renewed and the school must notify the student-athlete in writing by July 1 whether the athletic scholarship will be renewed for the next academic year.

Individual schools have appeal policies for scholarships that are reduced or not renewed. **In most cases, the coach decides who gets a scholarship, what it covers and whether it will be renewed.”**

It is notable, however, that while big time programs *may* offer multi-year scholarships, many schools oppose the practice and a relatively small number of schools are actually doing so. See *Few Athletes Benefit From Move to Multi-Year Scholarships* by Brad Wolverton and Jonah Newman<sup>8</sup>. This discretion by the coach can create significant economic issues for a student athlete. There are limitations on how many scholarships a coach may offer which creates a fixed supply. Problems with a fixed supply of scholarships plus discretion by the coach on renewing the student-athlete’s scholarship from year to year presents the following three major conflicts:

The coach who recruited the player may switch schools without penalty and the new coach no longer supports that player.

That player is not released to play somewhere else without the coach’s permission. The player is also required to sit out a year if he transfers.

The player may get injured and the coach decides he doesn’t need him anymore.

The combination of the NCAA Transfer Rules with the renewal of scholarship money subject to the Coaches discretion puts the student athlete at an economic disadvantage. Reform should include clearer, consistent guidelines with more protections for students. In fact, there is currently a class action lawsuit suing the NCAA for allegedly violating federal antitrust laws with regard to issuing scholarships. In sum, it is clear that restrictive transfer rules coupled with the one year scholarship system that generally is in force violate free market principles and stack the deck against the players who are, in fact, generating the revenue.

### **Lack of Comprehensive Health Care**

There is no question that the “health opportunity cost” associated with playing high level football during college is underreported and underestimated. Even those players who did not receive a debilitating injury during their tenure admit to having serious knee, leg, shoulder or other problems that remain with them for the rest of their lives. The NCAA reports that there are 20,718 football injuries a year. Knee injuries are the most common with around 4,000 incidences a year. The percentage breakdown listed on the NCAA website reports the following percentage by injuries:

- 7.4% concussions
- 4.3% head face and neck
- 16.9% upper limb
- 11.9% torso and pelvis
- 50.4% lower limb
- 9.1% other

Although injuries, particularly in football, are rather predictable, there is no comprehensive health insurance offered by the NCAA to their high level athletes. The NCAA requires that students carry medical coverage but doesn’t assist or provide the policies except for catastrophic coverage once you reach the \$90,000 threshold. Again, the student athlete and their family get short-changed. Many of the tragic stories of these injured athletes who lose their scholarship money and receive no help with the cost of their injuries have been frequently reported. Additionally, many of these

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<sup>8</sup> *Chronicle of Higher Education*- April 26, 2013- Volume 59 Issue 33

injuries that cause future disabilities are forgotten. Lack of full health insurance coverage for injuries sustained on the field for athletes who use their body to generate millions and millions for their school is incomprehensible.

**The Left Coast Speaks** - Mandating more equitable treatment for prospective student athletes is an idea that has been gaining traction; at least in California. In October of 2010, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed Assembly Bill 2079 the *Student-Athletes Right-To-Know Act*. This law require California schools to provide prospective athletes with accurate information concerning NCAA and institutional policies that affect sports-related medical expenses that might impact the athlete in question, scholarship renewal and transfer policies and the amount of out-of- pocket expenses that a scholarship does not cover.<sup>9</sup>

The State of California recently enacted a *Student Athletes Bill of Rights* law. This law, Senate Bill 1525 (signed into law by Governor Jerry Brown in September of 2012) requires schools to give academic scholarships to students who lose an athletic scholarship because of injury. The main provision of the law mandates that the schools are required to pay for insurance deductibles, as well as health care premiums, for low-income athletes. If there are future medical costs for injuries that occur while engaged in their sport, the universities are required to cover those costs. The law only applies to schools that receive more than \$10 million in media revenue and would only affect USC, UCLA, Stanford and California-Berkeley<sup>10</sup>.

These California laws are a big step in the right direction. While a similar law was enacted in Connecticut in 2013, these concepts have not yet caught on in other regions of the country.

**4. The NFL/NBA Awaits?** – While many fans of major college sports would probably concede the point that the players deserve a bit more compensation than their scholarship provides, this injustice is often rationalized by noting that these players will soon be off to the NFL or NBA where very attractive paydays await. This is understandable up to a point. Certainly fans of team sports, professional or college, tend to focus on the most outstanding performers. Obviously, many of the best players at FBS level schools do in fact matriculate to the professional ranks where even the lowest paid players garner huge salaries relative to the general working population. Nevertheless, it is important to assess the actual chances of rank and file FBS level FB/MBB players ever making the professional ranks.

In order to do this, basic original research found:

**Football** –Examining the roster of each NFL team in December of 2013 found a total of 361 “rookie” or first year players. Research conducted by Scott Kacsmar<sup>11</sup> shows that 87% of NFL players formerly played in the FBS ranks. It would seem reasonable to assume that about 87% of the annual rookie class consists of former FBS players. Thus, in a given year, about 315 NFL jobs become available for FBS level players. Assuming that each year about 25 players from each of the 121 FBS level programs graduate or otherwise complete their college careers, then about 3,000 players are competing for about 300 jobs or about a 10:1 ratio. While this almost certainly varies from year to year, a FBS football player has about a 10% chance of moving on to the NFL.

**Basketball** – Examining the NBA rosters in January of 2014 found that 45 rookies of the NBA total of 65 came from the FBS, or about 70%. Assuming that each year, about 4 players from each of the 121 FBS level basketball graduate or otherwise complete their college careers, then about 480 players are competing for 45 jobs. Once again this is about a 10:1 ratio. Note that NBA jobs are more difficult to come by for American major college players as many NBA teams have players from Europe and/or South America.

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<sup>9</sup> <http://www.chronicle.com/blogPost/blogPost=content/27359/>

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.votesmart.org/bill/15342/40390/establishes-a-student-athlete-bill-of-rights#42039>

<sup>11</sup> <http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1641528-where-does-nfl-talent-come-from>

As noted, the chances of moving up to the professional ranks vary from year to year, but a *very small percentage* of big-time college FB/MBB players ever enjoy the financial rewards of a NFL/NBA career.

**The Ed O'Bannon Case-** The most obvious injustice that student athletes face is that they are prohibited from exercising their own property right, that is, the ability to license their own name and likeness. Ed O'Bannon is suing the NCAA in a class action for the right of players to make their own deals with trading card companies, game companies, media rights, etc. Currently, the NCAA prohibits student-athletes from entering into group licensing deals. The lawsuit claims that the NCAA violates federal antitrust laws. The lawsuit has been partially certified as a class (the class consists of future players not past players). The progress of this case will be worth watching.

## Section 4 - A Game Plan For Reform

A brief review of the first three sections of the paper:

**Section 1,** provides an estimate of what FB/MBB players should be paid if they were compensated in a manner that reflects their actual economic value. While acknowledging the value of a full scholarship, it is quite clear that FB/MBB players are woefully under compensated, particularly at the upper end of the athletic budget spectrum.

**Section 2** establishes that major college athletic programs are almost drowning in money; particularly at the higher end of the revenue spectrum. This manifests itself in very attractive salaries for head football and basketball coaches, often in excess of *seven* figures. Spending per participant at the top 75 programs, on average, is about \$113,000 over and above the monetary value of a full scholarship at most schools. It seems that the departments may be running something less than a tight financial ship. It follows that resources may well be available to improve the lot of the FB/MBB players.

**Section 3** details the many other circumstances that often lead to, for want of a better word, exploitation of major college FB/MBB players. The sad truth is that many players are forced to leave college well short of the credits needed for a degree, with little realistic prospects of a professional sports career and perhaps afflicted with chronic injuries for which little or no financial assistance for medical care is forthcoming from neither their former school nor the NCAA. In addition, most players are subject to losing their scholarship on an annual basis if the coach deems their contribution to the team inadequate and players cannot transfer to another "Division 1" program without a mandatory "sit out" year.

With the announcements of new and lucrative television rights deals along with the knowledge that 79 head football coaches have joined the \$1 million plus per year salary club, more and more thoughtful people with an interest in this have begun to conclude that some reforms designed to address these basic inequities with respect to the players are needed. What follows is a discussion of how big time FB/MBB might be reformed.

To begin, there are many gradations of reform proposals. Generally, these range from paying a small cash "stipend" to revenue producing athletes, all the way up to the major colleges establishing some sort of openly professional league of teams that would retain an affiliation with the schools that they currently represent. All reform proposals have legitimate "pros and cons" and would result in "winners and losers" so to speak. A guiding principle is that reforms must be rooted in economic reality and must prioritize the interests of the players who are, after all, generating the fantastic sums of money that are flowing through this industry. It is also our core belief that, in general, a free market system tends to function best. It is obvious that the NCAA has created and now enforces a system that is basically the antithesis of a free market in so far as revenue producing athletes are concerned. After all, why does Alabama coach Nick Saban

make north of \$6 million per year while the best players that Mr. Saban coaches receive the value of a scholarship to the University of Alabama? The answer is free markets; or their absence. We also recognize that while there may have been an era in which the principles of “amateurism” were relevant and that a scholarship was adequate compensation to big time FB/MBB players. This era, if it ever existed, is now long gone. Major college FB/MBB in 2014 is commercial entertainment and the players are, essentially, in an employer/employee relationship. Reform proposal ideas are listed below, starting with those that would not require a fundamental overhaul of the current world order.

**Pay a cash “stipend” to athletes ranging from \$3,000 to \$30,000 per year** – Before proceeding with this, it is important to distinguish between revenue and non-revenue producing athletes. As was shown in the previous sections, FB/MBB generate the lion’s share of the revenue at most schools most of the time. Generally speaking, all other sports (men’s and women’s) fail to come anywhere close to covering their operating costs.

**Pay \$3,000 to FB/MBB players** – Assuming that the \$3,000 payment was made to 85 FB players and 13 MBB players, the annual cost would be \$294,000. This would not seem to be a major financial problem, especially in the upper echelons of the FBS. If, however, due to Title IX considerations, a \$3,000 payment, however, were accorded to all athletic participants, the cost would jump to as much as \$1.5 million, assuming 500 participants. This certainly seems financially doable at the high end of the FBS, but could be troublesome towards the bottom.

**Pay \$30,000 to FB/MBB players** – Assuming that the \$30,000 payment was made to 85 FB players and 13 MBB players, the annual cost would be \$2,940,000. Again, at the upper end of the FBS, this would seem to be affordable; obviously less so at the bottom. If Title IX and/or other considerations were to militate towards paying this amount to all athletes, the cost that may approach \$15 million may be difficult to handle; at least at the lower tier of the FBS.

**Deferred Compensation** – In an article appearing in the January 24, 2014 *Wall Street Journal*, Dr. Karl Borden of the University of Nebraska–Kearney suggests a system whereby payment to major college football players would be deferred for an agreed upon number of years after they complete their playing careers. The payments would be based upon the contributions players made to the team in question and upon their academic progress. Dr. Borden suggests that for football, the compensation pool be funded with 25% of gross football revenues. If this were ultimately paid out to 85 players (the scholarship limit), each player would accrue a payment of about \$97,000 per year. Deferring payment would allow the players to maintain their amateur status during their playing careers and provide additional incentive to contribute to the team and to make academic progress. This is an intriguing idea and has considerable merit. The downside is that it would eventually reduce the revenue accruing to the athletic departments by a substantial sum, which may be a problem at the lower end of the revenue spectrum. It would also be reasonable to assume that some would balk at continuing to bestow “amateur” status on players who are playing for monetary compensation, albeit on a deferred basis. In addition, paying money to players, even on a deferred basis, may run into Title IX and tax exempt status difficulties as would direct payment type plans.

Before proceeding to the pros and cons of paying a meaningful stipend to college athletes, let us acknowledge that any plan that pays money to college athletes over and above the cost of attendance is likely to be challenged on the grounds that it violates so-called Title IX regulations and/or may cause a university its status as tax exempt entity. This would happen if it were determined that paid athletes are employees who do not further the mission of the university; namely, teaching, research and public service. The obstacles to paying players are not trivial and are the result of federal law as opposed to NCAA regulations. (See Chapter 3 of *Saturday Millionaires*<sup>12</sup> for a comprehensive discussion of this). This is not to say that some sort of legal accommodation for paying money to players would be impossible to achieve, but under current law this constraint is probably substantial.

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<sup>12</sup> Dosh, Kristi- *Saturday Millionaires- How Winning Football Builds Winning Colleges* – Turner Publishing Co 2013

**Pros and Cons** – When it comes to money, as a general rule, something is better than nothing. Thus, from the athlete’s point of view even a modest cash payment would be a step up. While a \$3,000 stipend would likely suffice as pocket money, it would still come nowhere close to bridging the gap between what the FB/MBB players are worth relative to what they are being “paid”. In a like manner, while a \$30,000 stipend would seem bountiful, it would also be nowhere close the real value that the FB/MBB players produce for the major programs. Furthermore, paying a stipend at this level to all athletes might be fiscally challenging except for the very wealthiest schools.

The next problem that paying a modest stipend fails to address is that it would do little or nothing to ameliorate the need for compromising academic standards in order to keep players eligible to compete. Under current NCAA regulations, players must meet academic eligibility requirements. Typically, these are earning 18 academic credit hours per year and maintaining a Grade Point Average (GPA) that will qualify one to ultimately graduate. Generally, this means a minimum GPA ranging from 1.8 to 2.0, depending upon the number of hours completed. The basic idea is that one should be able to graduate after five years of enrollment; or be pretty close to doing so. While these regulations would not seem overly burdensome to the majority of rank and file students, many athletes in the big time sports struggle to remain in good academic standing. This can lead to varying levels of what might be politely deemed academic subterfuge. Pointing this out should not be construed as being critical of the athletes in question. The time and effort required to compete in FB/MBB at this level is substantial. Many hard working, conscientious students would be hard pressed to perform well in the classroom if they had a job as physically taxing as playing major college FB/MBB.

**Summary** – It would be reasonable to assume that most college athletes would be pleased to receive some additional compensation and this sort of a plan might help ease the collective conscious of some well paid coaches/administrators. Furthermore, it would certainly reduce/eliminate the need for ad hoc “under the table” type payments provided by boosters to players. That said, it is hard to see how such a plan does much to fundamentally reform the system. Even if the Title IX and “tax exemption” constraints could be overcome, paying say \$30,000 to the revenue producing athletes does not obviate the need to engage in academic subterfuge that is sometimes required to keep marginal students eligible nor does obviate the need to engage in questionable recruiting practices because the revenue producing athletes are still “worth” substantially more than a full scholarship plus \$30,000.

**2. Ensure that all NCAA athletes are provided with adequate health insurance that would cover all medical expenses for injuries that may occur both during their playing careers and for any chronic conditions that may develop after their careers that are the result of having participated in their sport. This insurance should be provided at no cost to the athlete/athlete’s family. This policy should apply to athletes in both revenue producing and non-revenue producing sports.**

This reform would seem like a classic “no brainer”. Given the vast sums of money accruing to the major programs and the vast sums of money accruing to the NCAA, it would seem that all athletes and their families should have this protection. While we make no claim of expertise regarding the byzantine world of health insurance, one would think that the NCAA and participating schools could partner up and use their buying power to accomplish this at a reasonable price. Certainly, reasonable safeguards could be agreed upon to prevent abuse by athletes and their families. Nonetheless, athletes who risk their health for very little compensation should at a minimum have this risk removed.

**3. End all restrictions on athlete transfers.**

By and large the arguments supporting the current NCAA rule that mandates a one-year delay in athletic participation for athletes transferring from one FBS level school to another FBS level school are lame. Due to the fact that FBS schools are allowed 85 football scholarships and 13 basketball scholarships, the inevitable result is that many highly- skilled athletes will be hard pressed to garner meaningful playing time at their respective school. If there is a common

denominator in team sports from ages 6 through 60, is that everyone on the team *wants to play*. In addition to having little prospect of playing time, there are plenty of other legitimate reasons a player may wish to attend another school and continue their sports career uninterrupted. It is not hard to imagine that the 3<sup>rd</sup> string QB at Ohio State might be a lot better than any QB at Rutgers. It would seem reasonable to allow transfers without any “sit out” year. The existence of this rule would seem to be largely a means by which schools maintain control of their revenue producing athletes. Certainly, schools would seek to take advantage of more liberal transfer rules to improve their team. So what? As anyone who follows professional sports knows, teams not only attempt to improve their roster year to year, but *intra season trades* and player acquisitions are common. Fortunately for the St. Louis Cardinals baseball team, Lou Brock did not have to sit out a year when the Cardinals acquired him in June of 1964. This reform not only would promote basic fairness for the athletes involved, it would likely improve competitive balance on the field and hardwood. It also almost goes without saying, coaches can and do accept more lucrative jobs without being forced to skip a season. This system is obviously unfair and could easily be changed.

#### **4. Mandate a Four-Year Academic Scholarship**

Historically, scholarships awarded to NCAA athlete have been renewable on a year-to-year basis at the school’s discretion. In essence, athletes could be “fired” so to speak for most any reason; including but not limited to inadequate performance on the field. Historically, NCAA rules mandated a one year scholarship. Under a new rule enacted in 2011, schools are *allowed* to offer multi-year scholarships, but are not required to do so. As noted, many schools remain reluctant to offer multi-year scholarships and relatively few are in fact choosing to do so. Having a one year scholarship renewable at the school’s discretion seems to provide the schools unwarranted control over the lives of athletes. To be sure, there are almost certainly circumstances that revoking a scholarship would be fully justified. Nevertheless, it would seem reasonable to allow an athlete a four-year academic scholarship assuming he is making reasonable progress towards a degree and has no significant conduct issues. Obviously, the particulars of such a policy could be negotiated, but the guiding principle should be that any athlete should be given a realistic chance for a degree regardless of how his playing career pans out. Once more, given the vast sums of money the big time FB/MBB programs generate, this should not be a huge financial burden.

## An Openly Professional System

The reforms discussed above would certainly improve the lot of revenue producing college athletes. Furthermore, the value of having the opportunity to attend college in exchange for participating on a football or basketball team is acknowledged. That said, it is evident that given the current day economics of major college FB/MBB that piecemeal reforms may not be equal to the task. The *average* football player in a Top 75 program is worth about \$435,352 per year, while an *average* basketball player in a Top 75 program is worth \$587,303. Major college FB/MBB players are being woefully shortchanged. Perhaps the only realistic way to remedy this shameful situation is to develop a system in which colleges can “sponsor” in some sense openly professional teams in FB/MBB.

In 1989, the book *The Hundred Yard Lie* by Rick Telander hit the book stores. At the time, Mr. Telander was a senior college football writer for *Sports Illustrated* magazine. In the book, Telander suggests that major college football become openly professional as the best way to restore integrity to the sport that was plagued with under the table payments to players and by academic dishonesty. For better or worse, the basic problems discussed in the Telander book are still with us. The main difference is that the money accruing to major college programs has increased enormously. With a nod to Mr. Telander, let us look at how an openly professional system might work in 2014. The new league is dubbed the *College Sponsored Professional Football/Basketball League (CSPFL or CSPBL)*.

The basic tenets of the CSPFL/CSPBL are as follows:

Players must be at least 18 years old and be no older than 23 years old and would be limited to five years of competition.

There would be no requirement that players be enrolled as students at their sponsoring school at any time. Certainly, this provision could be modified so as to require that athletes participating on these teams be enrolled as students even in a limited capacity and be achieving at least some modest academic goals.

Players would be paid a salary that would be subject to some sort of collective bargaining agreement reached by the participating teams and players. Players would also receive a voucher good for one year’s total cost of attending their sponsoring university for each year of service in the CSPFL/CSPBL, assuming they met the normal admission standards. There would be no time limit on redeeming the voucher. This provision could also be modified if the “salaries” being paid to players were sufficient to allow them to pay the normal tuition/fees at their sponsoring university.

As such, players would be encouraged to enroll as students at their sponsoring school if they met the normal admission criteria. The number of credit hours a player would be enrolled in at any given time would be entirely up to the player.

At colleges participating in the CSPFL/CSPBL, the remaining athletic program would continue much as it does now; funded by student fees, institutional support, athletic booster donations and whatever revenues they are able to generate on their own.

At colleges not participating in the CSPFL/CSPBL, their athletic programs including football and basketball would also function much as they do now. While these programs would still be competitive, they would be operating on a much reduced financial plane. Presumably, this would reduce the incentives for these programs to engage in some of the financial and academic shenanigans often seen in today’s big time programs.

Players in the CSPFL/CSPBL would be allowed unlimited rights to transfer to a different level of competition at the end of any season. The best CSPFL/CSPBL players could enter the NFL/NBA draft after any season. The best players in the conventional lower levels of college FB/MBB could move up to the CSPFL/CSPBL after any season if their skill level was adequate.

Teams in the CSPFL/CSPBL would agree to some sort of reasonable revenue sharing plan, limits on the size of the roster and adopt a per team salary cap so as to prevent unbridled competition for star players. The salary cap plan would also establish a minimum salary that would at least equal the cost of attending the sponsoring school for a year.

## **Football in the New World Order**

Based upon the estimates found in Section 1, in the 2012 season, the top 75 football programs generated \$3,820.9 million or an average of about \$51 million per program. Let us assume equal revenue sharing and the following allocations:

Player Salaries = 47% or \$24 million

Coach Salaries and Other Expenses = 23% or \$11.7 million

Payments to Sponsoring University for Use of Facilities, et al = 30% or \$15.3 million

Under this hypothetical allocation, the average player salary (assuming a 55 man roster) would be about \$436,000. There would be a healthy \$11.7 million available to pay the coaching staff, travel comfortably to road games and buy plenty of *Gatorade* for thirsty players and for pouring on the coach after a big win. The school would receive \$15.3 million which could be used in whole or in part to fund the non-revenue sports. Schools would also be free to use a portion of this money for non-athletic scholarships and/or to aid some part of their academic mission.

## **Basketball in the New World Order**

Based upon the estimates found in Section 1, in the 2012/2013 season, the top 75 basketball programs generated \$1,177.6 million or an average of about \$15.6 million per program. Let us assume equal revenue sharing and the following allocations:

Player Salaries = 49% or \$7.7 million

Coach Salaries and Other Expenses = 21% or \$3.3 million

Payments to Sponsoring University for Use of Facilities, et al = 30% or \$4.7 million

Under this hypothetical allocation, the average player salary (assuming a 13 man roster) would be about \$585,000. There would be a healthy \$3.3 million available to pay the coaching staff, travel comfortably to road games and buy plenty of *Gatorade* for thirsty players. (for some reason pouring *Gatorade* on the coach after a big win has not yet caught on in basketball). The school would receive \$4.7 million which could be used in whole or in part to fund the non-revenue sports. Once again, schools would also be free to use a portion of this money for non-athletic scholarships and/or to aid some part of their academic mission.

The aforementioned plan is hypothetical and the particulars would be subject to negotiation. It also makes two key assumptions:

A legal structure could be developed that would place the CSPFL/CSPBL teams outside the legal domain of the university so as to preclude Title IX and "tax exempt status" problems, but still allow the teams to retain an affiliation with their sponsoring university so that they could continue to play in the same facilities and retain the team nicknames, colors and other traditions.

The schools participating in the CSPFL/CSPBL would be amenable to some level of revenue sharing and to other rules that would foster competitive balance. Even with limiting this to the Top 75 schools, there are huge gaps in resources available at the top revenue schools versus the lower revenue schools.

## Pros and Cons

The Pros and Cons of going to an openly professional system are pretty straightforward.

**The Players:** The primary beneficiary of this plan would clearly be the players. They would be paid a just salary commensurate with their economic worth. Furthermore, it can be argued that players under this system would stand a better chance of becoming college graduates than they do at present. This is because the players who are motivated to obtain a degree and have the academic background with which to do so, would possess the school expense “vouchers” and/or plenty of money that would enable them to be enrolled in college. At said college, they would be free to pursue a course of study that suits them as opposed to courses of dubious worth designed to keep talented athletes eligible. It would also be reasonable to assume that players in the CSPFL/CSPBL would be able to enroll in enough classes in their off seasons such that their progress towards a degree would be comparable to athletes in the current system. For the athletes for whom a college degree is not a viable option, they would at least have earned substantial money during their playing days that will hopefully help set them up in a career that is right for them.

**Coaches/Administrators** – With much more money now being allocated to players, it would be reasonable to assume that coaches and administrator types might take a pay cut. That said, the above example still allows a hefty cut for coaches et al. The guess here is that they would not suffer too much.

**The Non-Revenue Sports** - Under the proposed new world order, those who play, coach and administer the non-revenue sports would almost certainly see significant belt tightening. Spending per participant at the big-time schools averages in excess of \$100K. Presumably, these programs could continue to operate with reduced funding levels. Furthermore, under the hypothetical operation described above, the schools sponsoring CSPFL/CSPBL teams would be paid substantial sums that could be allocated to the non-revenue sports. In addition to this, it would seem reasonable to ask *Major League Baseball* teams to allocate some money to college baseball programs who serve as their de facto farm system. In a like manner, the *Professional Golfers Association Tour* could supply some financial aid to collegiate golf programs. Many of today’s tour pros developed their skill while playing on college golf teams.

**Finally The Fans** – Most big time college FB/MBB teams have a huge enthusiastic fan base. (at least when they are winning). To be fair, some of the popularity of the teams may stem from the fact that the players are “amateurs”. Some, perhaps most college sports fans may well prefer rooting for and paying to watch players who play “for the love of the game” as opposed to money grubbing professional players. Certainly, this is a legitimate point of view. That said, any objective look at the finances of big time FB/MBB circa 2014 clearly shows that this enterprise has become big time, highly profitable commercial entertainment. Noting that professional sports also have large numbers of enthusiastic fans and noting that few fans seem to object to the enormous salaries paid to college coaches, the guess here is that paying fair compensation to the players would not substantially diminish fan interest in these sports. Furthermore, an openly professional system would likely result in improved competitive balance and would end the practice of big time college teams scheduling so-called “cupcake” games that generally produce lopsided, uninteresting games.

**Summary** – No matter where you may stand on the reform spectrum, there can be little doubt that the current system is egregiously unfair and demands some level of meaningful reform. It is our hope that by providing a more accurate look at the financial and other realities of big time college sports, that this paper may foster informed and intelligent discussion of these issues that will lead to more equitable treatment for the athletes so many of us enjoy watching.

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## APPENDIX

### Football Revenue & Player “Salaries”

	Football Bowl Subdivision Members	Total Football Revenue 2012 Season	Player Salary 47% of Total Revenue	Roster Size = 55
1	Texas	\$131,003,640	\$61,571,711	\$1,119,486
2	Alabama	\$116,186,064	\$54,607,450	\$992,863
3	Oklahoma	\$102,709,675	\$48,273,547	\$877,701
4	Florida	\$99,910,178	\$46,957,784	\$853,778
5	Notre Dame	\$96,601,189	\$45,402,559	\$825,501
6	Louisiana State (LSU)	\$96,354,618	\$45,286,670	\$823,394
7	Michigan	\$96,166,460	\$45,198,236	\$821,786
8	Auburn	\$90,012,399	\$42,305,828	\$769,197
9	Iowa	\$84,627,630	\$39,774,986	\$723,182
10	Georgia	\$80,869,382	\$38,008,610	\$691,066
11	Ohio State	\$80,254,956	\$37,719,829	\$685,815
12	Tennessee	\$76,558,303	\$35,982,402	\$654,225
13	Arkansas	\$75,043,727	\$35,270,552	\$641,283
14	Penn State	\$74,389,257	\$34,962,951	\$635,690
15	S. Carolina	\$73,154,381	\$34,382,559	\$625,137
16	Wisconsin	\$71,232,486	\$33,479,268	\$608,714
17	Nebraska	\$70,534,696	\$33,151,307	\$602,751

18	Oregon	\$67,766,505	\$31,850,257	\$579,096
19	Washington	\$64,502,900	\$30,316,363	\$551,207
20	U of Southern CA (USC)	\$61,256,438	\$28,790,526	\$523,464
21	Minnesota	\$57,855,891	\$27,192,269	\$494,405
22	Texas A&M	\$57,703,494	\$27,120,642	\$493,103
23	California-Berkeley	\$57,468,630	\$27,010,256	\$491,096
24	Colorado	\$55,765,036	\$26,209,567	\$476,538
25	Oklahoma State	\$54,479,745	\$25,605,480	\$465,554
26	Florida State	\$54,143,836	\$25,447,603	\$462,684
27	Kansas State	\$53,127,007	\$24,969,693	\$453,994
28	U-Cal Los Angeles (UCLA)	\$52,281,425	\$24,572,270	\$446,769
29	Clemson	\$51,716,122	\$24,306,577	\$441,938
30	Kansas	\$51,584,428	\$24,244,681	\$440,812
31	Mississippi	\$51,061,003	\$23,998,671	\$436,339
32	Michigan State	\$50,688,016	\$23,823,368	\$433,152
33	Georgia Tech	\$49,789,367	\$23,401,002	\$425,473
34	Arizona State	\$48,756,319	\$22,915,470	\$416,645
35	Texas Tech	\$48,039,930	\$22,578,767	\$410,523
36	Virginia- Tech	\$47,129,026	\$22,150,642	\$402,739
37	Kentucky	\$46,974,455	\$22,077,994	\$401,418
38	Iowa State	\$45,027,125	\$21,162,749	\$384,777
39	Northwestern	\$44,685,325	\$21,002,103	\$381,856
40	Miami-Florida	\$43,055,379	\$20,236,028	\$367,928
41	Stanford	\$42,000,057	\$19,740,027	\$358,910
42	Oregon State	\$41,289,802	\$19,406,207	\$352,840
43	Utah	\$41,224,458	\$19,375,495	\$352,282
44	West Virginia	\$40,408,592	\$18,992,038	\$345,310
45	N. Carolina	\$40,262,089	\$18,923,182	\$344,058
46	Purdue	\$39,892,017	\$18,749,248	\$340,895
47	Indiana	\$39,403,323	\$18,519,562	\$336,719
48	North Carolina State	\$39,096,153	\$18,375,192	\$334,094
49	Texas Christian	\$38,592,095	\$18,138,285	\$329,787
50	Louisville	\$36,634,075	\$17,218,015	\$313,055
51	Baylor	\$36,232,579	\$17,029,312	\$309,624
52	Mississippi State	\$35,333,981	\$16,606,971	\$301,945
53	Missouri	\$35,226,830	\$16,556,610	\$301,029
54	Rutgers	\$34,339,840	\$16,139,725	\$293,450
55	Washington State	\$34,003,909	\$15,981,837	\$290,579
56	Syracuse	\$33,766,677	\$15,870,338	\$288,552
57	Illinois	\$33,403,215	\$15,699,511	\$285,446
58	Arizona	\$32,119,316	\$15,096,079	\$274,474
59	South Florida	\$31,766,625	\$14,930,314	\$271,460
60	Boston College	\$30,538,129	\$14,352,921	\$260,962
61	Virginia	\$30,523,546	\$14,346,067	\$260,838
62	Connecticut	\$30,004,878	\$14,102,293	\$256,405
63	Central Florida	\$27,771,286	\$13,052,504	\$237,318

64	Vanderbilt	\$27,140,544	\$12,756,056	\$231,928
65	Brigham Young	\$26,756,131	\$12,575,382	\$228,643
66	Maryland	\$25,770,304	\$12,112,043	\$220,219
67	Duke	\$25,253,600	\$11,869,192	\$215,803
68	Boise State	\$25,030,404	\$11,764,290	\$213,896
69	Pittsburgh	\$23,784,796	\$11,178,854	\$203,252
70	Cincinnati	\$22,066,969	\$10,371,475	\$188,572
71	Southern Methodist	\$20,194,054	\$9,491,205	\$172,567
72	Wake Forest	\$20,020,961	\$9,409,852	\$171,088
73	Temple	\$19,359,086	\$9,098,770	\$165,432
74	Army	\$15,849,969	\$7,449,485	\$135,445
75	University of Memphis	\$15,379,136	\$7,228,194	\$131,422
76	Hawaii	\$15,319,619	\$7,200,221	\$130,913
77	Houston	\$15,286,686	\$7,184,742	\$130,632
78	Colorado State	\$15,265,925	\$7,174,985	\$130,454
79	Fresno State	\$14,739,714	\$6,927,666	\$125,958
80	San Diego State	\$14,553,127	\$6,839,970	\$124,363
81	E. Carolina	\$13,607,763	\$6,395,649	\$116,285
82	Marshall	\$13,493,049	\$6,341,733	\$115,304
83	Wyoming	\$13,268,129	\$6,236,021	\$113,382
84	Tulsa	\$13,169,115	\$6,189,484	\$112,536
85	Tulane	\$13,166,204	\$6,188,116	\$112,511
86	Rice	\$13,024,273	\$6,121,408	\$111,298
87	Texas State	\$12,765,426	\$5,999,750	\$109,086
88	Texas El Paso	\$12,247,162	\$5,756,166	\$104,658
89	Florida International	\$11,984,645	\$5,632,783	\$102,414
90	N. Texas	\$11,787,232	\$5,539,999	\$100,727
91	San Jose State	\$11,486,741	\$5,398,768	\$98,159
92	Middle Tennessee	\$11,393,022	\$5,354,720	\$97,359
93	Toledo	\$10,878,486	\$5,112,888	\$92,962
94	Ohio U	\$10,572,231	\$4,968,949	\$90,345
95	Utah State	\$10,498,016	\$4,934,068	\$89,710
96	Alabama-Birmingham	\$10,447,623	\$4,910,383	\$89,280
97	Akron	\$10,444,354	\$4,908,846	\$89,252
98	Buffalo	\$10,332,833	\$4,856,432	\$88,299
99	Western Michigan	\$10,187,770	\$4,788,252	\$87,059
100	Northern Illinois	\$10,156,540	\$4,773,574	\$86,792
101	Western Kentucky	\$10,140,752	\$4,766,153	\$86,657
102	New Mexico	\$10,111,449	\$4,752,381	\$86,407
103	Florida Atlantic	\$9,993,772	\$4,697,073	\$85,401
104	GA State	\$9,884,252	\$4,645,598	\$84,465
105	Southern MS	\$9,539,628	\$4,483,625	\$81,520
106	Miami-Ohio	\$9,472,711	\$4,452,174	\$80,949
107	Central Michigan	\$9,387,036	\$4,411,907	\$80,216
108	New Mexico State	\$9,154,368	\$4,302,553	\$78,228
109	Kent State	\$9,104,832	\$4,279,271	\$77,805

110	U Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV)	\$8,806,335	\$4,138,977	\$75,254
111	Ball State	\$8,653,167	\$4,066,988	\$73,945
112	Bowling Green	\$8,569,428	\$4,027,631	\$73,230
113	Eastern Michigan	\$8,482,476	\$3,986,764	\$72,487
114	Troy	\$8,379,934	\$3,938,569	\$71,610
115	Louisiana-Lafayette	\$8,345,530	\$3,922,399	\$71,316
116	Nevada	\$8,323,076	\$3,911,846	\$71,124
117	Louisiana Tech	\$7,636,199	\$3,589,014	\$65,255
118	Idaho	\$7,069,713	\$3,322,765	\$60,414
119	South Alabama	\$6,821,667	\$3,206,183	\$58,294
120	Arkansas State	\$6,801,171	\$3,196,550	\$58,119
121	Louisiana-Monroe	\$4,156,766	\$1,953,680	\$35,521
	<b>Average</b>	<b>\$35,618,313</b>	<b>\$16,740,607</b>	<b>\$304,375</b>
	<b>Average top 75 Programs</b>	<b>\$50,945,412</b>	<b>\$23,944,343</b>	<b>\$435,352</b>

### Men's Basketball Revenue & Player "Salaries"

	Football Bowl Subdivision Members plus Select Basketball Schools	Men's Basketball Revenue 2013	Player Salary 49%	Roster Size = 13
1	Louisville	\$55,335,062	\$27,114,180	\$2,085,706
2	Kansas	\$40,411,903	\$19,801,832	\$1,523,218
3	Kentucky	\$35,702,570	\$17,494,259	\$1,345,712
4	Indiana	\$34,490,170	\$16,900,183	\$1,300,014
5	Arizona	\$28,188,113	\$13,812,175	\$1,062,475
6	Wisconsin	\$27,043,197	\$13,251,167	\$1,019,321
7	Duke	\$26,942,843	\$13,201,993	\$1,015,538
8	Syracuse	\$26,472,618	\$12,971,583	\$997,814
9	N. Carolina	\$25,108,925	\$12,303,373	\$946,413
10	Ohio State	\$24,656,969	\$12,081,915	\$929,378
11	N. Carolina State	\$22,595,938	\$11,072,010	\$851,693
12	Minnesota	\$22,590,493	\$11,069,342	\$851,488
13	Maryland	\$22,240,450	\$10,897,821	\$838,294
14	Illinois	\$21,070,959	\$10,324,770	\$794,213
15	Texas	\$20,233,173	\$9,914,255	\$762,635
16	Purdue	\$19,673,828	\$9,640,176	\$741,552
17	Michigan State	\$19,591,835	\$9,599,999	\$738,461
18	Arkansas	\$18,947,745	\$9,284,395	\$714,184
19	Northwestern	\$18,724,545	\$9,175,027	\$705,771
20	Tennessee	\$18,420,786	\$9,026,185	\$694,322
21	U-California-Los Angeles (UCLA)	\$18,136,842	\$8,887,053	\$683,619
22	Florida	\$17,885,362	\$8,763,827	\$674,141
23	Michigan	\$17,468,014	\$8,559,327	\$658,410

24	Xavier	\$16,757,886	\$8,211,364	\$631,643
25	Oklahoma State	\$16,740,001	\$8,202,600	\$630,969
26	Connecticut	\$16,555,298	\$8,112,096	\$624,007
27	Marquette	\$16,427,217	\$8,049,336	\$619,180
28	Alabama	\$15,968,880	\$7,824,751	\$601,904
29	Pittsburgh	\$15,918,750	\$7,800,188	\$600,014
30	Iowa	\$15,413,410	\$7,552,571	\$580,967
31	Missouri	\$15,369,231	\$7,530,923	\$579,302
32	Kansas State	\$14,689,553	\$7,197,881	\$553,683
33	Cal-Berkeley	\$14,485,932	\$7,098,107	\$546,008
34	Georgetown	\$14,148,465	\$6,932,748	\$533,288
35	Penn State	\$13,271,752	\$6,503,158	\$500,243
36	Iowa State	\$13,151,120	\$6,444,049	\$495,696
37	Virginia- Tech	\$13,019,139	\$6,379,378	\$490,721
38	Miami-Florida	\$12,506,397	\$6,128,135	\$471,395
39	Oklahoma	\$12,358,083	\$6,055,461	\$465,805
40	University of Memphis	\$11,901,062	\$5,831,520	\$448,578
41	U-Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV)	\$11,880,361	\$5,821,377	\$447,798
42	Washington	\$11,709,191	\$5,737,504	\$441,346
43	S. Carolina	\$11,687,117	\$5,726,687	\$440,514
44	Auburn	\$11,366,243	\$5,569,459	\$428,420
45	Florida State	\$11,258,839	\$5,516,831	\$424,372
46	West Virginia	\$11,237,925	\$5,506,583	\$423,583
47	Wake Forest	\$11,208,342	\$5,492,088	\$422,468
48	Villanova	\$10,957,085	\$5,368,972	\$412,998
49	Virginia	\$10,863,002	\$5,322,871	\$409,452
50	Virginia Commonwealth	\$10,710,227	\$5,248,011	\$403,693
51	Oregon	\$10,560,637	\$5,174,712	\$398,055
52	Vanderbilt	\$10,514,662	\$5,152,184	\$396,322
53	South Florida	\$10,334,222	\$5,063,769	\$389,521
54	Baylor	\$10,327,209	\$5,060,332	\$389,256
55	Louisiana State (LSU)	\$10,178,696	\$4,987,561	\$383,659
56	DePaul	\$10,119,528	\$4,958,569	\$381,428
57	Georgia Tech	\$9,813,560	\$4,808,644	\$369,896
58	Nebraska	\$9,784,117	\$4,794,217	\$368,786
59	Texas A&M	\$9,765,256	\$4,784,975	\$368,075
60	Texas Tech	\$9,707,681	\$4,756,764	\$365,905
61	Mississippi	\$9,694,987	\$4,750,544	\$365,426
62	Arizona State	\$9,555,727	\$4,682,306	\$360,177
63	San Diego State	\$9,293,131	\$4,553,634	\$350,280
64	Mississippi State	\$9,228,470	\$4,521,950	\$347,842
65	Gonzaga	\$9,212,799	\$4,514,272	\$347,252
66	Cincinnati	\$9,164,738	\$4,490,722	\$345,440
67	Stanford	\$9,152,459	\$4,484,705	\$344,977
68	Southern Methodist	\$9,113,582	\$4,465,655	\$343,512
69	Georgia	\$8,827,425	\$4,325,438	\$332,726

70	Oregon State	\$8,718,261	\$4,271,948	\$328,611
71	Seton Hall	\$8,615,501	\$4,221,595	\$324,738
72	Colorado	\$8,273,851	\$4,054,187	\$311,861
73	Rutgers	\$8,202,403	\$4,019,177	\$309,167
74	Utah	\$8,092,256	\$3,965,205	\$305,016
75	Clemson	\$7,825,416	\$3,834,454	\$294,958
76	Creighton	\$7,802,316	\$3,823,135	\$294,087
77	U-Southern California (USC)	\$7,723,642	\$3,784,585	\$291,122
78	Brigham Young	\$7,683,716	\$3,765,021	\$289,617
79	New Mexico	\$7,474,520	\$3,662,515	\$281,732
80	Texas Christian	\$7,449,972	\$3,650,486	\$280,807
81	Boston College	\$7,270,204	\$3,562,400	\$274,031
82	Nevada	\$7,060,315	\$3,459,554	\$266,120
83	Butler	\$6,564,305	\$3,216,509	\$247,424
84	Washington State	\$6,423,351	\$3,147,442	\$242,111
85	Temple	\$6,058,780	\$2,968,802	\$228,369
86	Colorado State	\$6,052,758	\$2,965,851	\$228,142
87	Wyoming	\$5,255,875	\$2,575,379	\$198,106
88	Notre Dame	\$4,880,121	\$2,391,259	\$183,943
89	Alabama-Birmingham	\$4,768,859	\$2,336,741	\$179,749
90	Tulsa	\$4,697,157	\$2,301,607	\$177,047
91	Houston	\$4,666,853	\$2,286,758	\$175,904
92	St. Louis	\$4,555,797	\$2,232,341	\$171,719
93	Central Florida	\$4,540,065	\$2,224,632	\$171,126
94	Ohio U	\$4,330,779	\$2,122,082	\$163,237
95	Western Kentucky	\$4,224,389	\$2,069,951	\$159,227
96	Marshall	\$4,130,590	\$2,023,989	\$155,691
97	E. Carolina	\$4,128,229	\$2,022,832	\$155,602
98	New Mexico State	\$3,914,409	\$1,918,060	\$147,543
99	Utah State	\$3,905,088	\$1,913,493	\$147,192
100	Hawaii	\$3,869,795	\$1,896,200	\$145,862
101	Rice	\$3,775,891	\$1,850,187	\$142,322
102	Texas El Paso	\$3,615,731	\$1,771,708	\$136,285
103	Tulane	\$3,612,934	\$1,770,338	\$136,180
104	Texas State	\$3,577,629	\$1,753,038	\$134,849
105	Boise State	\$3,568,496	\$1,748,563	\$134,505
106	Buffalo	\$3,416,687	\$1,674,177	\$128,783
107	N. Texas	\$3,410,998	\$1,671,389	\$128,568
108	Akron	\$3,157,271	\$1,547,063	\$119,005
109	Kent State	\$3,153,331	\$1,545,132	\$118,856
110	Georgia State	\$3,150,373	\$1,543,683	\$118,745
111	Middle Tennessee	\$3,114,755	\$1,526,230	\$117,402
112	Fresno State	\$3,007,546	\$1,473,698	\$113,361
113	Pepperdine	\$2,938,725	\$1,439,975	\$110,767
114	Western Michigan	\$2,734,225	\$1,339,770	\$103,059
115	Florida International	\$2,606,718	\$1,277,292	\$98,253

116	Miami-Ohio	\$2,600,720	\$1,274,353	\$98,027
117	Southern Mississippi	\$2,599,577	\$1,273,793	\$97,984
118	Toledo	\$2,590,838	\$1,269,511	\$97,655
119	Central Michigan	\$2,393,870	\$1,172,996	\$90,230
120	San Jose State	\$2,377,961	\$1,165,201	\$89,631
121	Louisiana Tech	\$2,299,668	\$1,126,837	\$86,680
122	Ball State	\$2,279,941	\$1,117,171	\$85,936
123	Louisiana-Lafayette	\$2,211,286	\$1,083,530	\$83,348
124	South Alabama	\$2,098,990	\$1,028,505	\$79,116
125	Bowling Green	\$2,028,236	\$993,836	\$76,449
126	Eastern Michigan	\$1,937,460	\$949,355	\$73,027
127	Northern Illinois	\$1,804,478	\$884,194	\$68,015
128	Idaho	\$1,783,403	\$873,867	\$67,221
129	Troy	\$1,688,638	\$827,433	\$63,649
130	Arkansas State	\$1,364,218	\$668,467	\$51,421
131	Florida Atlantic	\$1,251,960	\$613,460	\$47,189
132	Louisiana-Monroe	\$888,762	\$435,493	\$33,499
133	Army	\$544,181	\$266,649	\$20,511
	<b>Average</b>	<b>\$10,530,728</b>	<b>\$5,160,057</b>	<b>\$396,927</b>
	<b>Average top 75 Programs</b>	<b>\$15,700,926</b>	<b>\$7,693,454</b>	<b>\$591,804</b>

## Football Coaches Salaries

\$ amounts rounded to nearest thousand and shown in thousands

### NCAAF 2012 Season

RANK	SCHOOL	HEAD COACH	TOTAL PAY	MAX BONUS	POTENTIAL TOTAL PAY (Total Pay + Max Bonus)
1	Texas	Mack Brown	\$5,454	\$850	\$6,304
2	Alabama	Nick Saban	\$5,546	\$700	\$6,246
3	Arkansas	Bret Bielema	\$5,159	\$700	\$5,859
4	Tennessee	Butch Jones	\$4,859	\$1,000	\$5,859
5	Iowa	Kirk Ferentz	\$3,985	\$1,750	\$5,735
6	Oklahoma	Bob Stoops	\$4,773	\$820	\$5,593
7	Arizona State	Todd Graham	\$2,303	\$3,159	\$5,462
8	LSU	Les Miles	\$4,459	\$700	\$5,159
9	Ohio State	Urban Meyer	\$4,608	\$550	\$5,158
10	South Carolina	Steve Spurrier	\$3,323	\$1,550	\$4,873
11	Michigan	Brady Hoke	\$4,154	\$550	\$4,704
12	Louisville	Charlie Strong	\$3,739	\$808	\$4,547
13	Georgia	Mark Richt	\$3,314	\$1,000	\$4,314
14	Washington	Steve Sarkisian	\$2,575	\$1,525	\$4,100

15	Oklahoma State	Mike Gundy	\$3,450	\$550	\$4,000
16	Nebraska	Bo Pelini	\$2,975	\$1,000	\$3,975
17	Colorado	Mike MacIntyre	\$2,404	\$1,500	\$3,904
18	Cincinnati	Tommy Tuberville	\$3,413	\$465	\$3,878
19	Texas A&M	Kevin Sumlin	\$3,100	\$750	\$3,850
20	Auburn	Gus Malzahn	\$2,440	\$1,250	\$3,690
21	Missouri	Gary Pinkel	\$2,800	\$850	\$3,650
22	Mississippi	Hugh Freeze	\$2,006	\$1,575	\$3,581
23	North Carolina State	Dave Doeren	\$2,555	\$1,000	\$3,555
24	Georgia Tech	Paul Johnson	\$2,516	\$1,025	\$3,541
25	Penn State	Bill O'Brien	\$3,283	\$200	\$3,483
26	Kentucky	Mark Stoops	\$2,001	\$1,475	\$3,476
27	Florida State	Jimbo Fisher	\$2,750	\$675	\$3,425
28	Kansas State	Bill Snyder	\$2,803	\$580	\$3,383
29	Mississippi State	Dan Mullen	\$2,700	\$650	\$3,350
30	Clemson	Dabo Swinney	\$2,550	\$775	\$3,325
31	Purdue	Darrell Hazell	\$2,161	\$1,095	\$3,256
32	West Virginia	Dana Holgorsen	\$2,630	\$600	\$3,230
33	Florida	Will Muschamp	\$2,735	\$454	\$3,189
34	Utah	Kyle Whittingham	\$2,427	\$740	\$3,167
35	Texas Christian	Gary Patterson	\$3,121	--	\$3,121
36	Kansas	Charlie Weis	\$2,504	\$615	\$3,119
37	UCLA	Jim Mora	\$2,300	\$750	\$3,050
38	Maryland	Randy Edsall	\$2,025	\$950	\$2,975
39	Virginia	Mike London	\$2,190	\$715	\$2,905
40	Washington State	Mike Leach	\$2,250	\$625	\$2,875
41	Virginia Tech	Frank Beamer	\$2,452	\$383	\$2,835
42	Oregon	Mark Helfrich	\$1,800	\$1,035	\$2,835
43	Arizona	Rich Rodriguez	\$2,150	\$610	\$2,760
44	California	Sonny Dykes	\$2,394	\$304	\$2,698
45	Iowa State	Paul Rhoads	\$1,712	\$950	\$2,662
46	Michigan State	Mark Dantonio	\$1,960	\$650	\$2,610
47	Southern California	Lane Kiffin	\$2,594	--	\$2,594
48	Wisconsin	Gary Andersen	\$2,121	\$440	\$2,561
49	South Florida	Willie Taggart	\$1,808	\$650	\$2,458
50	Texas Tech	Kliff Kingsbury	\$1,855	\$600	\$2,455
51	Boise State	Chris Petersen	\$2,152	\$290	\$2,442
52	Baylor	Art Briles	\$2,426	--	\$2,426
53	Fresno State	Tim DeRuyter	\$655	\$1,685	\$2,340
54	Wake Forest	Jim Grobe	\$2,252	--	\$2,252
55	Northwestern	Pat Fitzgerald	\$2,221	--	\$2,221
56	Miami	Al Golden	\$2,148	--	\$2,148
57	Central Florida	George O'Leary	\$1,535	\$600	\$2,135
58	North Carolina	Larry Fedora	\$1,730	\$346	\$2,076

59	Minnesota	Jerry Kill	\$1,200	\$875	\$2,075
60	Indiana	Kevin Wilson	\$1,291	\$780	\$2,071
61	Southern Methodist	June Jones	\$1,991	--	\$1,991
62	Vanderbilt	James Franklin	\$1,843	--	\$1,843
63	Connecticut	Paul Pasqualoni	\$1,700	\$117	\$1,817
64	Duke	David Cutcliffe	\$1,792	--	\$1,792
65	Illinois	Tim Beckman	\$1,700	\$80	\$1,780
66	Oregon State	Mike Riley	\$1,418	\$360	\$1,778
67	San Diego State	Rocky Long	\$800	\$855	\$1,655
68	Memphis	Justin Fuente	\$957	\$625	\$1,582
69	East Carolina	Ruffin McNeill	\$1,150	\$380	\$1,530
70	Navy	Ken Niumatalolo	\$1,514	--	\$1,514
71	Colorado State	Jim McElwain	\$1,350	\$150	\$1,500
72	Hawaii	Norm Chow	\$620	\$880	\$1,500
73	Houston	Tony Levine	\$902	\$340	\$1,242
74	Utah State	Matt Wells	\$503	\$735	\$1,238
75	Wyoming	Dave Christensen	\$1,200	\$25	\$1,225
76	Western Kentucky	Bobby Petrino	\$856	\$355	\$1,211
77	Rutgers	Kyle Flood	\$860	\$350	\$1,210
78	Air Force	Troy Calhoun	\$903	\$248	\$1,151
79	New Mexico	Bob Davie	\$764	\$330	\$1,094
80	Notre Dame	Brian Kelly	\$1,088	--	\$1,088
81	Arkansas State	Bryan Harsin	\$725	\$245	\$970
82	Army	Rich Ellerson	\$402	\$550	\$952
83	Texas-El Paso	Sean Kugler	\$500	\$450	\$950
84	Louisiana-Lafayette	Mark Hudspeth	\$803	\$105	\$908
85	Alabama at Birmingham	Garrick McGee	\$550	\$330	\$880
86	Middle Tennessee State	Rick Stockstill	\$704	\$158	\$862
87	Toledo	Matt Campbell	\$458	\$400	\$858
88	Southern Mississippi	Todd Monken	\$701	\$133	\$834
89	Georgia State	Trent Miles	\$510	\$305	\$815
90	Florida Atlantic	Carl Pelini	\$497	\$318	\$815
91	Ohio	Frank Solich	\$514	\$299	\$813
92	Louisiana Tech	Skip Holtz	\$510	\$295	\$805
93	Miami Ohio	Don Treadwell	\$400	\$394	\$794
94	Nevada	Brian Polian	\$525	\$250	\$775
95	San Jose State	Ron Caragher	\$525	\$195	\$720
96	Marshall	Doc Holliday	\$621	\$80	\$701
97	Ball State	Pete Lembo	\$399	\$265	\$664
98	Buffalo	Jeff Quinn	\$325	\$335	\$660
99	Rice	David Bailiff	\$646	--	\$646
100	Nevada-Las Vegas	Bobby Hauck	\$504	\$140	\$644
101	Kent State	Paul Haynes	\$383	\$261	\$644
102	North Texas	Dan McCarney	\$545	\$85	\$630

103	Western Michigan	P.J. Fleck	\$393	\$236	\$629
104	Tulsa	Bill Blankenship	\$620	--	\$620
105	Florida International	Ron Turner	\$500	\$120	\$620
106	Akron	Terry Bowden	\$400	\$205	\$605
107	Central Michigan	Dan Enos	\$361	\$224	\$585
108	Massachusetts	Charley Molnar	\$419	\$163	\$582
109	Northern Illinois	Roderick Carey	\$376	\$205	\$581
110	New Mexico State	Doug Martin	\$375	\$185	\$560
111	Idaho	Paul Petrino	\$400	\$152	\$552
112	Troy	Larry Blakeney	\$481	\$68	\$549
113	Bowling Green	Dave Clawson	\$401	\$109	\$510
114	Texas State	Dennis Franchione	\$373	\$133	\$506
115	Eastern Michigan	Ron English	\$375	\$90	\$465
116	Old Dominion	Bobby Wilder	\$450	\$0	\$450
117	South Alabama	Joey Jones	\$384	\$39	\$423
118	Texas-San Antonio	Larry Coker	\$351	\$30	\$381
119	Louisiana-Monroe	Todd Berry	\$288	\$43	\$331

Source: *USA Today*

## Men's Basketball Coaches Salaries

**\$ amounts rounded to nearest thousand and shown in thousands**

RANK	SCHOOL 2013 Season	HEAD COACH	TOTAL PAY	MAX BONUS	POTENTIAL TOTAL PAY (Total Pay + Bonus)
1	Duke	Mike Krzyzewski	\$7,224	\$0	\$7,224
2	Louisville	Rick Pitino	\$4,973	\$725	\$5,698
3	Kansas	Bill Self	\$4,961	\$525	\$5,486
4	Minnesota	Tubby Smith	\$2,216	\$2,600	\$4,816
5	Florida	Billy Donovan	\$3,689	\$472	\$4,161
6	Michigan State	Tom Izzo	\$3,746	\$350	\$4,096
7	Indiana	Tom Crean	\$2,886	\$740	\$3,626
8	Ohio State	Thad Matta	\$3,194	\$410	\$3,604
9	Arizona	Sean Miller	\$2,519	\$985	\$3,504
10	North Carolina State	Mark Gottfried	\$1,950	\$1,313	\$3,263
11	Wisconsin	Bo Ryan	\$2,357	\$400	\$2,757
12	UCLA	Ben Howland	\$2,250	\$235	\$2,485
13	Missouri	Frank Haith	\$1,650	\$825	\$2,475
14	Oklahoma	Lon Kruger	\$2,100	\$270	\$2,370
15	Oregon	Dana Altman	\$1,800	\$520	\$2,320
16	Mississippi	Andy Kennedy	\$1,306	\$1,003	\$2,309
17	Villanova	Jay Wright	\$2,290	\$0	\$2,290
18	Oklahoma State	Travis Ford	\$2,275	\$0	\$2,275
19	Colorado	Tad Boyle	\$598	\$1,675	\$2,273

20	Georgetown	John Thompson	\$2,211	\$0	\$2,211
21	Illinois	John Groce	\$1,400	\$775	\$2,175
22	Kansas State	Bruce Weber	\$1,500	\$655	\$2,155
23	California	Mike Montgomery	\$1,757	\$350	\$2,107
24	Michigan	John Beilein	\$1,866	\$200	\$2,066
25	Virginia Commonwealth	Shaka Smart	\$1,380	\$649	\$2,029
26	Wichita State	Gregg Marshall	\$1,187	\$803	\$1,990
27	Cincinnati	Mick Cronin	\$1,359	\$555	\$1,914
28	Syracuse	Jim Boeheim	\$1,906	\$0	\$1,906
29	New Mexico	Steve Alford	\$1,248	\$655	\$1,903
30	Iowa State	Fred Hoiberg	\$1,212	\$675	\$1,887
31	North Carolina	Roy Williams	\$1,774	\$111	\$1,885
32	Pittsburgh	Jamie Dixon	\$1,830	\$0	\$1,830
33	Memphis	Josh Pastner	\$1,220	\$545	\$1,765
34	Gonzaga	Mark Few	\$1,572	\$0	\$1,572
35	Creighton	Greg McDermott	\$1,370	\$0	\$1,370
36	Butler	Brad Stevens	\$1,166	\$0	\$1,166
37	Akron	Keith Dambrot	\$426	\$723	\$1,149
38	Nevada-Las Vegas	Dave Rice	\$766	\$345	\$1,111
39	Marquette	Buzz Williams	\$1,105	\$0	\$1,105
40	Colorado State	Larry Eustachy	\$500	\$600	\$1,100
41	San Diego State	Steve Fisher	\$858	\$185	\$1,043
42	Western Kentucky	Ray Harper	\$377	\$628	\$1,005
43	Belmont	Rick Byrd	\$729	\$0	\$729
44	Temple	Fran Dunphy	\$725	\$0	\$725
45	New Mexico State	Marvin Menzies	\$434	\$225	\$659
46	Notre Dame	Mike Brey	\$617	\$0	\$617
47	Saint Mary's	Randy Bennett	\$517	\$0	\$517
48	Boise State	Leon Rice	\$441	\$76	\$517
49	Albany	Will Brown	\$293	\$203	\$496
50	James Madison	Matt Brady	\$294	\$200	\$494
51	La Salle	John Giannini	\$426	\$0	\$426
52	Middle Tennessee State	Kermit Davis	\$304	\$80	\$384
53	Davidson	Bob McKillop	\$380	\$0	\$380
54	Montana	Wayne Tinkle	\$179	\$146	\$325
55	Pacific	Bob Thomason	\$323	\$0	\$323
56	Liberty	Dale Layer	\$309	\$0	\$309
57	Southern	Roman Banks	\$115	\$181	\$296
58	Florida Gulf Coast	Andrew Enfield	\$160	\$95	\$255
59	Bucknell	Dave Paulsen	\$222	\$0	\$222
60	North Carolina Tech	Cy Alexander	\$150	\$34	\$184
61	South Dakota State	Scott Nagy	\$153	\$17	\$170
62	Northwestern State La	Mike McConathy	\$127	\$16	\$143

## What Others Are Saying About This Paper

St. Louis Post-Dispatch – February 23rd -<http://goo.gl/eAp0h1>

Chicago Sun-Times – April 10th -<http://www.suntimes.com/sports/26768558-419/unionizers-dont-want-cut-of-ncaas-profits-just-a-better-seat-at-table.html>

Kansas City Star – March 26th – [www.kansascity.com/2014/03/26/4917761/labor-board-rules-that-northwestern.html](http://www.kansascity.com/2014/03/26/4917761/labor-board-rules-that-northwestern.html)

Des Moines Register – May 12th [www.desmoinesregister.com/story/sports/columnists/2014/05/12/hawkeyes-cyclones-nick-collison-robert-gallery-northern-iowa/8998671/](http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/sports/columnists/2014/05/12/hawkeyes-cyclones-nick-collison-robert-gallery-northern-iowa/8998671/)

Iowa Press Citizen- May 12th – [www.hawkcentral.com/2014/05/12/how-much-could-hawkeye-athletes-earn-more-than-you-think/](http://www.hawkcentral.com/2014/05/12/how-much-could-hawkeye-athletes-earn-more-than-you-think/)

The Athens News - April 20th- [www.athensnews.com/ohio/article-42336-study-some-ou-athletes-would-earn-six-figures-if-paid-fairly.html](http://www.athensnews.com/ohio/article-42336-study-some-ou-athletes-would-earn-six-figures-if-paid-fairly.html)